In this paper we incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy as an alternative policy scheme. In particular, we develop an international oligopoly model, where governments issue non-cooperatively a number of permits and then allow their trading by their polluting...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting frms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their .rm, however,...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting Ã??rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of two large and symmetric countries producing tradable commodities and a public consumption good. Destination or origin-based taxes are levied on the consumption of the tradable goods. In both countries, an institutional minimum...

We combine consumption generated cross-border pollution and public pollution abatement in a theoretical framework to examine the efficiency of the destination and origin principles of commodity taxation. The key result of our study is that with public pollution abatement, the non-cooperative...