In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

preferences. We characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy …-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority …

We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first … misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first … version of group robust stability, called weak group robust stability. Our main theorem, then, proves that there is a weakly …

condition of strong acyclicity is nearly impossible to satisfy: any priority structure is quasi-cyclic whenever there are two …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of … college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking …