We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under … preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …

(partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under … preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the …

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash … Equilibria and the stability of outcomes. …

military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and …