The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60 (1992) 1009] and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos [Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998) 245] have attracted attention due to their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic...

We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a...

In this paper we consider a family of cost allocation rules for which agents pay a share of their incremental cost as well as of any ‘debt’ from prior agents. This family encompasses the Bird rule and the free riding rule (where terminal agents pay everything) as the two extreme cases. By...

The Serial Cost Sharing Rule was originally conceived for situations where the demands of agents pertain to a homogeneous private good, produced by an unreplicable technology. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This paper investigates the...

We pursue the analysis of the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule by examining how the cost share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We also provide bounds for cost shares under an appropriate assumption on the cost function. On poursuit l'analyse de la...

The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These...

This paper examines a situation in which the production activities of different agents, in a common geographical location, create waste products that are either of a similar biological or chemical composition or offer commercially compatible combinations. What we propose here, therefore, is a...