This paper evaluates the performances of Perturbation Methods, the Parameterized Expectations Algorithm and Projection Methods in finding approximate decision rules of the basic neoclassical stochastic growth model. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on comparing numerical methods...

We study the Ramsey (1928) model under the assumption that households act strategically. We compute the Markov perfect equilib- rium for this model and compare it to the original, competitive equi- librium and to a strategic open-loop equilibrium proposed by Sorger (2002, 2005b). We show that,...

In this paper we study the e®ects of nonlinearities on the forecast- ing performance of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We compute ¯rst and second-order approximations to a New Keyne- sian monetary model, and use arti¯cial data to estimate the model's structural parameters...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation whereagents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2- coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

We propose a model of price competition where consumers exogenously differ in the number of prices they compare. Our model can be interpreted either as a non–sequential search model or as a network model of price competition. We show that i) if consumers who previously just sampled one firm...

The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of 1/2...