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We introduce here the first volume of Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization: Theory, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, by describing its main aim and its basic structure.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257500
We introduce here the second volume of the Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, describing its main aim and its basic structure.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257501
We introduce here the volume Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, by describing its main aim and its basic structure.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015255009
In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about the parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We find that most of the standard tools in dominant strategy implementation, like the revelation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504319
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370580
We provide an elementary proof showing how in economics with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371174
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596597
In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823904
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses the winner when the contestants.efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We define the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543484
In this paper we study the allocations yielded by kinked demand curves. We will see that there are several difficulties with this concept. Some of them can be eliminated by the consideration of reasonable conjectures
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008549625