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Foundations for contest success functions
Corchón, Luis C. (contributor); Dahm, Matthias (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003424035
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Trials, tricks and transparency : how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge
Dahm, Matthias; González, Paula; Porteiro, Nicolás - In: Journal of health economics 28 (2009) 6, pp. 1141-1153
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931673
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Foundations for contest success functions
Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 43 (2010) 1, pp. 81-98
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003940029
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Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003972119
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Rent seeking and rent dissipation : a neutrality result
Alcalde, José; Dahm, Matthias - In: Journal of public economics 94 (2010) 1/2, pp. 1-7
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951449
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Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - In: Social choice and welfare 30 (2008) 4, pp. 531-559
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003676496
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Tullock and Hirshleifer : a meeting of the minds
Alcalde, José (contributor); Dahm, Matthias (contributor) - 2007 - 1. ed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003598232
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Tulllock and Hirshleifer : a meeting of the minds
Alcalde, José; Dahm, Matthias - In: Review of economic design : RED 11 (2007) 2, pp. 101-124
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552781
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Lobbying of firms by voters
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874301
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How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2012
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532679