We examine a competitive theory in which new ideas are introduced only when diminishing returns to the use of existing ideas sets in. After an idea is introduced, the capital associated with that idea expands, and the price of the idea falls. Once the price falls far enough, it becomes...

"We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which...

In some experiments, rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. The authors bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, they suppose that the observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their...

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash Equilibrium.

Ordinarily labor market equilibrium implies that the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, and that the employer is indifferent between equally productive employees. When the marginal worker is indifferent to employment, employer preferences do not matter. If, however, the marginal...