government can use tax more efficiently as a commitment device to control the union's wage demand so as to maintain lower wage …

or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is …, we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public firm's dominant strategy …, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash …

or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able … substitute goods, we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot … (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large). Thus, there are …

private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is sufficiently large. Consequently, we show that … substitutes or complements, if the degree of public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy … for both public and private firms that choose Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant strategy only for the …

contract stage by each critical value of the public firm's inefficiency. In particular, Cournot and Bertrand competition … positive primary outputs holds, (i) Bertrand competition or quantity-price competition can occur depending on the degree of … public firm's inefficiency when the goods are substitutes. (ii) regardless of its inefficiency, there can be always sustained …

The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly. The …) simultaneous wage setting is the outcome. The first result coincides with the choices of the private firm, its union, and the union …