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All-stage strong correlated equilibrium
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 1, pp. 184-188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656800
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Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 2, pp. 394-400
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657365
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Sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games
Heller, Yuval - In: Operations research 60 (2012) 1, pp. 209-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532622
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528208
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Justifiable choice
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 375-390
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703133
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Language, meaning, and games : a model of communication, coordination, and evolution : comment
Heller, Yuval - In: The American economic review 104 (2014) 6, pp. 1857-1863
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405655
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Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 84 (2014), pp. 132-136
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481225
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241
We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673975
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Instability of belief-free equilibria
Heller, Yuval - In: Journal of economic theory 168 (2017), pp. 261-286
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011747487
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Three steps ahead
Heller, Yuval - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 203-241
We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599539