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This chapter defines defense economics and indicates how it differs from other subfields of economics. The nature and topics of defense economics are presented. A brief history of the field is also reviewed. The current importance of defense economics in the post-cold war era is discussed....
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Since the end of the Cold War, the world remains a dangerous place with new threats: regional conflicts, transnational terrorist networks, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). The second volume of the Handbook of Defense Economics...
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Weapons programs are criticized for cost overruns, delays in delivery and failure to meet their operational requirements. Critics focus on the power and influence of the military-industrial-political complex. This chapter addresses these controversial areas involving arms industries, alternative...
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Voluntary military alliances, such as NATO, are often criticized for failing to exploit the opportunities for equipment standardization and free trade. However, nationalism means that governments adopt a variety of industrial policies for purchasing defense equipment, leading to departures from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005457203
This chapter surveys the past applications of game theory to the study of terrorism. By capturing the strategic interplay between terrorists and targeted governments, game theory is an appropriate methodology for investigating terrorism and counterterrorism. Game theory has been used to examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005457208
This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two...
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