Since 2005, the EU ETS has provided a market-based price signal for European carbon emissions, accompanied by increasing economic research related to this policy instrument. In this paper, we carry out a review of the empirical literature examining allowance price formation. A consensus has...

We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers' actual utility, and the counterfactual utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include protecting...

In this paper we develop a framework to value public investments with the purpose of increasing bicycling that explicitly accounts internal costs of bicycling, which are typically neglected in current established approaches that value bicycle spending by means of gross health benefits alone, as...

Because of a link between the EU ETS and the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms, the emission certificates traded on these markets are in principle interchangeable assets; despite of this, a persistent price difference exists. We explain this price spread using a theoretical model that combines three...

We extend the literature on local income tax competition by allowing for inter-jurisdictional spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of a publicly provided good. Comparing decentralized second-best results of a theoretical model with an efficient benchmark, we identify three...

We use a panel dataset of UK workers to look for evidence of compensating wage differentials for workplace risk. Risk data are available at the four-digit industry level or at the three-digit occupation level. We discuss various econometric problems associated with the hedonic wage approach,...

The allowance price in Phase I of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) followed a peculiar path, increasing from €7 in 2005 to over €30 in 2006, before crashing, recovering and ultimately finishing at zero by the end of 2007. I examine if the price can be explained by...

We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these...

We develop a model of Tiebout sorting based on decentralized income taxation, which allows for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of the publicly provided good. We identify three sources of welfare loss from decentralization: Imperfect redistribution, inter-jurisdictional...