This paper studies how litigation and settlement behavior is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American and the English fee-shifting rule. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures and settlement requests are higher for more spiteful...

We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises...

Two sellers with differentiated products compete and coordinate in a market by setting price frames first in Stage 1 and price levels later in Stage 2. A consumer's purchase decision depends not only on the difference of the net values, but also on the difference of the price frames. An increase...

This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...

We propose a framework for modeling the influence of normative considerations on decision-making and social interaction. Our key insight is that axiomatic models like those used in cooperative game theory can be reinterpreted as theories of moral reasoning and norm formation which describe the...

Immigration today presents two distinct but related problems. The first, and most neglected, relates to the money supply and currency values: due to the global availability of Western Union and Moneygram, remittances to home countries have exploded in the last decade, with estimates running into...

We analyze the choices between two technologies A and B that both exhibit network effects. We introduce a critical mass game in which coordination on either one of the standards constitutes a Nash equilibrium outcome while coordination on standard B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We present a...

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player...

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players` equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner`s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player is...