Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...

We investigate how informational frictions affect trading in decentralized markets in theory and in a laboratory setting. Subjects, matched pairwise at random, trade divisible commodities that have different private values for a divisible asset with a common value (interpreted as money). We...

Countercyclical dispersion of firm outcomes (micro dispersion) is commonly used as a proxy for micro uncertainty. In this paper, we characterize conditions under which micro dispersion and micro uncertainty co-move positively in the context of a large Cournot economy with dispersed information...

Recent research finds that investors, broadly defined, react to the linguistic tone of quarterly earnings conference calls; there is a positive relation between firms' stock returns and call tone (a measure of “sentiment” related word tabulations). However, this type of soft information can...

There is a continuum of agents, each of whom trades a divisible asset via demand function competition. Individual valuations are determined by multiple idiosyncratic and common shocks, regarding which the agent observes multi-dimensional signals. The only assumptions are that the signals are...

Will arbitrage capital flow into markets experiencing shocks, mitigating adverse effects on price efficiency? Not necessarily. In a dynamic model with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, price efficiency plays a dual role, determining both the profitability of new arbitrage and...

This paper develops a market microstructure model with asymmetric information in order to quantify the influence which practical decision rules have on asset prices. The users of practical decision rules have incomplete information at their disposal and trade in a market with both fully informed...

Shareholders follow stocks more closely when they can hold a larger number of shares. A company which expands its investor base without raising capital, redistributes shares from incumbent to new shareholders, and therefore reduces the value of information. Thus, an investor base expansion...

This paper studies how strategic interaction between players can influence their decisions as to whether to acquire information and whether to reveal their private information to others. We show how a player can increase his utility by disclosing part of his private information, when such...

This paper develops a finite-period model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to higher-order uncertainty. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is...