Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government's and the...

We study how institutional design in influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can...

In der vorliegenden Studie wurde der Frage nachgegangen, welche öffentlichen Unterstützungsleistungen für Nachfolgen in Deutschland angeboten werden und inwiefern eine staatliche Förderung notwendig ist. Neben einer Bestandsaufnahme des Förderangebots wurden die Probleme des...

Conducting a building thermal efficiency retrofit (or further thermal retrofit) is a long and relatively complex decision-making process involving building owners, managers, residents/tenants, and construction industry professionals. A variety of information instruments exists to support...

Eine energetische Gebäudesanierung (Sanierung zur Erhöhung der Energieeffizienz) erfordert einen langen, relativ komplexen Entscheidungsprozess für Gebäudeeigentümer, -verwalter, Mieter sowie Bauhandwerker. Es gibt verschiedene Möglichkeiten diese Akteure in Ihren Entscheidungen durch...

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium...

The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the...

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects, so that she...

We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...