How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a...

This paper analyses a model in which two groups repeatedly compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: if there is a fight today, yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group. Hence, a change of the status quo has...

We analyze a model in which voters learn over time their preferences regarding an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different majority rules. We show that...

In real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperfections in plurality and runoff rule voting games. We call a strategy profile a robust equilibrium if it is an equilibrium if the probability of a miscount is positive but small.All robust...

This paper analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status quo already in the first period or whether to...

A central problem for the game theoretic analysis of voting is that voting games have very many Nash equilibria. In this paper, we consider a new refinement concept for voting games that combines two ideas that appear reasonable for voting games: First, trembling hand perfection (voters...

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition - proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide...