We empirically study the existence and impact of search frictions in the market for corporate control in order to explain who makes acquisitions. We proxy search frictions with the board of director's degree of connectedness. Alternatively, we capture such frictions using geographic proximity...

We empirically study the existence and impact of search frictions and the importance of golden parachute provisions in the market for corporate control. We proxy search frictions with the board's degree of connectedness, and also with measures of market thickness, geographic proximity and...

We investigate the impact of excess perk consumption on crash risk in state-owned enterprises in China. To enjoy excess perks, executives in state-owned enterprises have an incentive to withhold bad news for extended periods, leading to higher future stock price crash risk. Consistent with this...

This paper studies the long-term consequences of actions induced by vesting equity, a measure of short-term incentives. Vesting equity is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a...

Drawing on insights from the beauty premium literature and behavioral finance, we investigate the influence of attractiveness of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and board members on Initial Public Offering (IPO) valuations and market efficiency. Our theory highlights the role of attractiveness...

Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to...

This paper offers new evidence on informed trading around merger and acquisition announcements from the UK equity and options market. The analysis suggests that in about 25%-33% of events there is abnormal option trading volume during the month that precedes the announcement. Such evidence is...

We examine insider trading in about 3,700 targets of takeovers announced during 1988-2006 and in a control sample of non-targets, both during an ‘informed' and a control period. Using difference-in-differences regressions of several insider trading measures, we find no evidence that insiders...

This paper examines the pattern and profitability of institutional trades around takeover announcements. We find that the trades of funds as a group, either before or after takeover announcements, are not profitable. However, funds whose main broker is also a target advisor are net buyers of...

Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activities are not well-anticipated corporate events in the equity market. Do institutional investors possess material non-public information before M&A announcements? Using a novel methodology that infers high frequency institutional trading, this paper investigates...