Eliaz (2004) has established a 'meta-theorem' for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness of...

It is well known that the literature on judgment aggregation inherits the impossibility results from the aggregation of preferences that it generalises. This is due to the fact that the typical judgment aggregation problem induces an ultrafilter on the the set of individuals, as was shown in a...

This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework...

This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework...

Eliaz (2004) has established a "meta-theorem" for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness of...

Eliaz (2004) has established a "meta-theorem" for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness of...