We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of …

We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of …

observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second …

unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model …, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a …

I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching …

In many centralized matching markets, agents' property rights over objects are derived from a coarse transformation of … stable matching mechanisms, the optimal design can be attained by splitting agents into at most three indifference classes …

Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for dynamic problems and show that it yields a matching that satisfies strong … stability. It is not Pareto dominated by any other matching, and, if there is an efficient stable matching, it must be the Gale … stronger impossibility result: For the class of dynamic matching problems that we study, there are no algorithms that satisfy …

design of the matching procedure can prevent unraveling. … changes to the network structure on the unraveling of the market towards early hiring. Moreover, we show that an efficient …