In this paper we introduce a model of a society with two distinct linguistic groups, each consisting of heterogeneous individuals speaking their native language. There is also a world language so that every individual is faced with four learning choices: to study the other local language only,...

We endogenize the formation of domestic trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm. The foreign firm can undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in the domestic market should trade policies become too stringent. We model trade policy formation as a common agency...

We introduce the notion of language disenfranchisement which arises if the number of EU working languages is reduced. We use the data on language proficiency in EU and show that, in spite of the widespread knowledge of English, the retention of French and German as working languages in essential...

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from the rest of the world. The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and...

In this paper we investigate how strategic interactions among domestic and foreign producers influence the structure of the industry. Especially, we focus on the foreign firms choice between exporting versus servicing these markets by investing in a plant located in host country when is facing...

Immigrants in economies with a dominant native language exhibit substantial heterogeneities in language acquisition of the majority language. We model partial equilibrium language acquisition as an equilibrium phenomenon. We consider an environment where heterogeneous agents from various...

In this paper we consider an urban population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the real line that faces a problem of location and financing of multiple public facilities. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction: stability under unanimous...

Two incumbent parties choose their platforms in a unidimensional policy space while facing a credible threat of an entry by the third party. Relative electoral support is the predominant objective of each party, and the third party enters only if it can displace one of the incumbents. In an...

In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers...