We examine how organizational structure affects corporate payout policies. Conglomerates (multi-segment firms) pay out more than pure plays (single-segment firms) in both cash dividends and total payouts (defined as cash dividends plus share repurchases). Further, corporate payouts increase as...

We find that the 52-week high effect (George and Hwang, 2004) cannot be explained by standard risk factors. Instead, it is more consistent with investor underreaction caused by anchoring bias: the presumably more sophisticated institutional investors suffer less from this bias and buy (sell)...

While the costs associated with dual-class shares and other antitakeover provisions are widely documented, the benefits are rarely studied in the literature. We test the hypothesis that dual-class shares, like other antitakeover provisions, can help managers focus on the implementation of...

We find that the 52-week high effect (George and Hwang, 2004) cannot be explained by risk factors. Instead, it is more consistent with investor underreaction caused by anchoring bias: the presumably more sophisticated institutional investors suffer less from this bias and buy (sell) stocks close...

We find that actively managed mutual funds have higher ownership in pure-play firms than in conglomerates. The results show that fund managers’ industry expertise explains this preference because investing in pureplays allows the industry expertise to concentrate in one industry and investing...

We analyze a firm's choice between spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and tracking stock issues and the role of institutional investors in corporate restructuring. We model a firm with two divisions. Insiders have private information about firm value and face an equity market with retail and...