We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis...

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on...

We find that the 52-week high effect (George and Hwang, 2004) cannot be explained by risk factors. Instead, it is more consistent with investor underreaction caused by anchoring bias: the presumably more sophisticated institutional investors suffer less from this bias and buy (sell) stocks close...

While the costs associated with dual-class shares and other antitakeover provisions are widely documented, the benefits are rarely studied in the literature. We test the hypothesis that dual-class shares, like other antitakeover provisions, can help managers focus on the implementation of...

We find that the 52-week high effect (George and Hwang, 2004) cannot be explained by standard risk factors. Instead, it is more consistent with investor underreaction caused by anchoring bias: the presumably more sophisticated institutional investors suffer less from this bias and buy (sell)...

We find that actively managed mutual funds have higher ownership in pure-play firms than in conglomerates. The results show that fund managers’ industry expertise explains this preference because investing in pureplays allows the industry expertise to concentrate in one industry and investing...