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Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations

Muller, Wieland; Schotter, Andrew - Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS), New York … - 2007

contests. We find that while in the aggregate the behavior of our subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005770972

Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders

Kirkegaard, René - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 98-110

In many contests, a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729778

On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Yoon, Kiho - Institute of Economic Research, Korea University - 2012

This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641739

Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction

Kirkegaard, Rene - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2010

In many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465788

Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds

Kirkegaard, René - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2007

Comparative statics for contests with two privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous contestants are analyzed … part of the paper considers dynamic contests in which one bidder may endogenously be revealed to be weak. For example, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040600

Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps

Kirkegaard, Rene - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2008

We examine a contest, modelled as an all-pay auction, in which a strong and a weak contestant compete, and where a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestant's score by a fixed percentage; the latter is an additive bonus. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168870

Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps

Kirkegaard, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 226-248

I examine a contest with identity-dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous. A contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestantʼs score by a fixed percentage; the latter is an additive bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049730

Competition amongst contests

Azmat, Ghazala; Möller, Marc - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2008

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an … exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce … incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players’ aggregate effort will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772229

Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions

Konrad, Kai A. - 2005

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the allpay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296367

Silent interests and all-pay auctions

Konrad, Kai Andreas - 2005

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333027