Although there is a vast theoretical literature on the existence of a tradeoff between equity and efficiency, empirical investigations often fail to find evidence for this proposition. Furthermore there are hints that some social models in Europe can cope better with this trade-off and are...

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in...

Growing number of studies accentuated enigmas in PDS system, many of them provided evidences based on National Sample Survey (NSS) and other official statistics, more particularly by major states. Many of them also highlighted theoretical and operational difficulties in existing policy...

Faut-il réformer la caisse de compensation au Maroc? Par Essaid Tarbalouti Version, Mars 2014 The debate on the efficiency of the subsidy of the prices of foodstuffs granted by the policy of compensation and his reform are deeply livened up between the government and the opposition in terms of...

An allocation of indivisible items among n ≥ 2 players is proportional if and only if each player receives a proportional subset—one that it thinks is worth at least 1/n of the total value of all the items. We show that a proportional allocation exists if and only if there is an allocation...

We analyze a simple sequential algorithm (SA) for allocating indivisible items that are strictly ranked by n ≥ 2 players. It yields at least one Pareto-optimal allocation which, when n = 2, is envy-free unless no envy-free allocation exists. However, an SA allocation may not be maximin or...

This book presents the distributional implications inherent to cost-benefit analysis, shows how distributional value judgements underly traditional efficiency analysis and the treatment of accounting prices, and provides guidelines for estimating the distributional effects of investment...

We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of the market (hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional constraints. We show that when the preferences and constraints of the hospitals can be represented by an M-natural-concave function, (i) the generalized...

We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and...

Gordon Tullock is recognized for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as...