We apply ideas from fiscal federalism to reassess how fiscal authority should be delegated within a monetary union. In a real-economy model with no fiscal externalities, in which local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage about the preferences of their citizens for public spending...

In this paper, we incorporate a transfer mechanism into a DSGE model with a rich fiscal sector to assess the effectiveness of fiscal transfers for a monetary union, in particular for the Economic and Monetary Union. Using a heterogeneous setup, the model is estimated for the North and the South...

In the wake of the euro area crisis, the debate on instruments to deepen economic integration among its members has intensified, among others putting forward a fiscal stabilization capacity for EMU members. Contributions made so far to further this idea have mostly concentrated on the...

In a monetary union, the interaction between several governments and a single central bank is plagued by several sources of deficit bias, including common pool problems. Each government has strong preferences over local spending and taxation but suffers only part of the costs of union-wide...

We study cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal policy in a multi-country model where asset markets are segmented and countries face terms of trade externalities. We show that the optimal form of fiscal cooperation, or fiscal union, is defined by the Armington elasticity of substitution between...