We study the role of commitment in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (JPE, 1983) model with no aggregate uncertainty. As is well known, the banking authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start. We show, however,...

In the wake of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, there has been extensive commentary and regulatory focus on the 'Too Big to Fail' issue. In this paper, we survey the proposed solutions and regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of...

Given the indisputable cost of policy inaction in the run-up to banking crises as well as the negative side effects of unwarranted policy activation, policymakers would strongly benefit from earlywarning thresholds that more accurately predict crises and produce fewer false alarms. This paper...

I revisit the Diamond-Dybvig model of liquidity insurance in the presence of hidden trades. The key result is that in this environment deposit-taking banks are not necessary for the efficient provision of liquidity. Mutual funds are constrained efficient when supplemented with the same...

How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy...

There is a longstanding debate about whether banking panics and other financial crises always have fundamental causes or are sometimes the result of self-fulfilling beliefs. Disagreement on this point would seem to present a serious obstacle to designing policies that promote financial...

Articles 37(10) and 56-58 of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014, “establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (...)” (hereinafter the ‘BRRD') govern the provision of ‘extraordinary...

This paper analyzes the effects of government bailouts in a modified Diamond-Dybvig model. Following Keister (2010), my model includes both a private good and a public good. Bailouts are assumed to crowd out pub- lic good provision and improve the ex-post allocation of resources during a bank...

The present study examines the impact of the current fiscal crisis in the euro area on the Greek banking system and the measures adopted to preserve its stability. It is divided into 3 Sections:(a) Section 1 contains an overview of the causes of the recent (2007-2009) international financial...