Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...

This paper examines the legal-economic dimension of collusive manipulation of prices from the perspective of the Kautiliya Arthasastra, an ancient Indian treatise on law and statecraft, which is among the oldest sources of information about cartels. It identifies cartels in the treatise, shows...

In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...

Complexity science is widely used across the policy spectrum but not in antitrust. This is unfortunate. Complexity science enables a rich understanding of competition beyond the simplistic descriptions of markets and firms proposed by neoclassical models and their contemporary neo-Brandeisian...

Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...