Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for...

We analyze voluntary coalition formation using a unique panel data for 1,056 municipalities in the French region of Brittany between 1995 and 2002. We use a control function approach to develop a binary discrete choice model with spatial interactions. We find that a municipality’s decision to...

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of intermunicipal fiscal cooperation on municipal public spending, based on the French experience. A model of municipal spending choice is estimated using panel data and spatial econometrics for municipalities over the period 1994–2003....

We study the business tax ("taxe professionnelle") behavior of the intermediate level (department) of local government in France and test in the same model the two hypotheses that department tax rates are explained by upper tier (region) tax rates and by tax rates chosen by other departments. We...

L'objet de cet article est d'expliquer les choix fiscaux des agglomérations françaises et plus particulièrement le rôle des interactions fiscales horizontales et verticales dans le choix de leur taux de taxe professionnelle. Dans un premier temps, nous construisons un modèle théorique...

L'existence d'interactions spatiales entre les choix d'imposition des départements français de métropole est testée économétriquement. Pour cela, un modèle de choix fiscal avec autorégression spatiale est spécifié pour estimer la pente de la fonction de meilleure réponse qui relie le...

In this paper, we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites. We first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are...