We study the allocation of indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We show that the only allocation mechanism (upto Pareto-indifference) that satisfies the axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism is the one that equalizes the...

Two dynamic general equilibrium economies compete in explaining the United States' interwar business cycles. Despite the demand driven contender's slight advantages, the results remain too close to call a clear winner.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether adding labour market frictions improves the basic New Keynesian model's ability to generate greater inflation persistence and plausible labour market dynamics. This paper builds and compares two sticky price models, one of which is augmented by an...

Countercyclical markups are a key transmission mechanism in many endogenous business cycle models. Yet, recent findings suggest that aggregate markups in the US are procyclical. The current model adresses this issue. It extends Gali's (1994) composition of aggregate demand model by endogenous...

We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine whether conflict encourages hawkish behavior, and if such behavior can itself aggravate conflict. We consider situations of conflict between a state and an insurgent group, such as conflict over a piece of land. Negotiations are...

The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveller makes a scheduled visit to a set of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveller...

We study the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible tasks in a multi-object-demand model (i.e., each agent can be assigned multiple objects) where monetary transfers are allowed. Agents. costs for performing tasks are their private information and depend on what other tasks they are...

We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the...

The risk-neutral equilibrium bidding strategy for first-price auctions with independent private values is justified without assuming a well-defined Bayesian game. Bidders, aware of their own value, assume the private values to be linearly related. The latter, however, are independent and...