This paper conducts a macroeconomic welfare analysis of securitization in a real business cycle model with a banking sector. I model securitization as an optional interbank funding channel that credibly reduces the diversion ability on borrowed funds and increases operation costs on loan assets....

Do bankrupt firms impose negative externalities on their non-bankrupt competitors? We propose and analyze a collateral channel in which a firm's bankruptcy reduces collateral values of other industry participants, thereby increasing the cost of external debt finance industry wide. To identify...

Using an extensive new data set on corporate bond defaults in the U.S. from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the U.S. has experienced many severe corporate default crises...

There are many reasons to regret the decision of U.S. financial authorities to insert the government into the resolution of the investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008. The Federal Reserve's use of its discount window built up false hope of future rescues. Paying off the uninsured creditors...

This paper incorporates banks and banking panics within a conventional macroeconomic framework to analyze the dynamics of a financial crisis of the kind recently experienced. We are particularly interested in characterizing the sudden and discrete nature of the banking panics as well as the...

At the epicenter of the 2008 financial crisis was the shadow banking system, which conducts liquidity and maturity transformation by investing in long-term assets and financing them through collateralized debts with very short maturity, such as asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repurchase...

We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...

A firm's termination generates bankruptcy costs. This may create incentives for a firm's owner to bail out a firm in bankruptcy and to curb the firm's risk taking outside bankruptcy. We analyze the role of such implicit guarantees in the context of financial institutions that sponsor money...

This article reassess informational financial contagion theory relevant to systemic risk in banking in the light of a coordination problem approach to economics, and then proceed to analyze and comment some related types of systemic risk policies. Typically, policies to limit or contain...

Tracing the SEC ban on the short selling of financial stocks in September 2008, this paper investigates whether such selling activity before the 2008 short ban reflected financial companies’ risk exposures in the subprime crisis. The evidence suggests that short sellers sold short stocks that...