In this paper we present the results of an experiment aimed at testing the ability of consumers to coordinate actions in a market in which network externalities are present. Such markets are characterized by the necessity for consumers to believe that a certain minimum number of people will buy...

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH,...

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a “social planner” or a “veil of ignorance” experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer...

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en-vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricingmodel. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa-tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own predictions....

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a 'social planner' or a 'veil of ignorance' experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH,...