This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

The paper deals with the literature on social evolution.

This paper explores the quantitative relation between non-random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics.

A hostage with respect to an action of a player is defined here to be an amount ofpayoff that will be placed in the opponent's possession if the player takes the action. Whereas the only Nash equilibrium for a prisoner's dilemma game is mutual defection, it is shown that there are at most two...

This paper presents a general method for computing value conrrespondences under perfect monitoring and discounting.

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...

I introduce a model of extensive form games with coalitional actions, which provides a formal framework for analysing situations in which coalitions of players may take joint actions sequentially. I present an equilibrium concept that generalizes subgame-perfect equilibrium, and is closely...

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in regrad to invariance and randomness), sometimes found...

In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably...