We introduce a new zero-sum matrix game for modeling search in structured domains. In this game, one player tries to find a "bug" while the other tries to hide it. Both players exploit the structure of the "search" domain. Intuitively, this search game is a mathematical generalization of the...

The general approach for the pricing of rainbow (or colored) options with fixed transaction costs is developed from the game theoretic point of view. The evolution of the underlying common stocks is considered in discrete time. The main result consists in the explicit calculation of the hedge...

Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique suggested by L. S. Shapley for finite permutation games, we prove similar results for infinite permutation games. Infinite transportation games can be interpreted as a generalization...

This paper defines a measure of bargaining uncertainty that quantifies Roth's concept of strategic risk. It shows how this measure can be used for checking reliability of the Shapley value in cost allocation problems and in the theory of competitive equilibrium. Salient properties of the new...

Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit)...

Consider G = (X1,…,XM,g1,…,gM) an M-player game in strategic form, where the set Xi is an interval of real numbers and the payoff functions gi are differentiable with respect to the related variable xi ∈ Xi. If they are also concave, with respect to the related variable, then it is...

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents...

This paper shows how strategic matching generates reputation-building behavior in an evolutionary chain-store game. Strategic matching means the possibility for an entrant to choose in a strategic way the local market into which it will move. Players are boundedly rational and follow behavioral...

This paper studies a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbour regions as a dynamic game. These two regions do not only share an environmental problem but they are also engaged in interregional trade. A good produced in one region is traded to the other which uses it as an input....

A formula is presented for computing the equilibrium payoffs in a generic finite two-person game when the support of the equilibrium is known.