In this paper, we present two real-world situations in which the standard hypotheses of a bargaining problem do not hold, and discuss how to tackle these situations.

This paper examines the existence of Berge equilibrium. Colman et al. provide a theorem on the existence of this type of equilibrium in the paper [Colman, A. M., Körner, T. W., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, J. Math. Psychol. 55,...

Meier [Games Econ. Behav. 62, 53–66] shows that the universal knowledge–belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge–belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper, we introduce...

Im folgenden Beitrag wird die Dynamik von Marktprozessen in der deutschen Automobilindustrie mit Hilfe von Regelkreismodellen und Zeitreihenanalysen sichtbar gemacht und quantifiziert. Dargestellt werden der Markträumungs-, der Renditenormalisierungs-, der Übermachterosions-, der...

No abstract received.

In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel probability measures that assign a rational probability to every Borel event. Then, he constructed the corresponding...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in...

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close...

The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the...

We study a non-cooperative model of unilateral network formation. Derks et al. [2008b] prove the existence of local-Nash and global-Nash networks for games with payoff functions that satisfy a framework of axiomatic properties. These properties are inspired by the one-way flow model, which is...