In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained...

This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pierre (2004, 2005) and their adaptation to dynamical games. The inertia function associates with any initial state-control pair the smallest of the worst norms over time of the velocities of the...

Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of...

The paper analyzes strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem under different information scenarios. Given uncertainty about environmental cost and irreversibility of development, "learning without destroying" emerges from strategic competition when information is endogenous...

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

The aim of this paper is to discuss a new concept of well-posedness for non cooperative games. Starting from the definition of (∊,k) equilibrium as the point where every player either guarantees at least k or he (she) does not lose more than ∊, we introduce an original definition of...

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners' Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for...

A computational procedure, Simulated Fictitious Play (SFP), is introduced to approximate equilibrium solutions for n-person, non-cooperative games with large strategy spaces. A variant of the iterative solution process fictitious play (FP), SFP is first demonstrated on several small n-person...

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used...

No abstract received.