Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain conditions, it is highly likely that individuals coordinate on a (pay-off) efficient through risk inferior convention. This contrasts with other equilibrium refinement criteria, such as risk...

The topic is two-fold. First, we prove the convexity of Owen's Airport Profit Game (inclusive of revenues and costs). As an adjunct, we characterize the class of 1-convex Airport Profit Games by equivalent properties of the corresponding cost function. Second, we classify the class of 1-convex...

The interaction between a sophisticated player and a fictitious player is analyzed and applied to the problem of optimal enforcement. An adaptive potential offender myopically responds to the history of past enforcement. How can a sophisticated enforcement official take advantage of this...

No abstract received.

From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the...

This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework. It should be noted that...

In 2012, the scientific world has lost N.N. Krasovskii, an extraordinary mathematician and mechanician whose works have prominently influenced a number of mathematic fields: differential equations, optimal control, and dynamic games theory. His research had profound effects on the development of...

This introduction presents the theme of this volume, the rationale for it, and the history of the conference series from which it originated. It provides also a short description of the papers included.

We look at the basic applications of cooperative game theory to economic situations. These include bargaining and cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the fundamental tools for these applications. We consider the...

In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games. We define a characteristic function over the cycles of a digraph. We present a mathematical model for this situation and an axiomatic characterization of a solution for this class of cooperative games. This is introduced as a method to...