A cooperative TU game is said to posses a large core as defined by Sharkey [1982] if for every acceptable vector there is a smaller core vector in the game. This paper is devoted to characterization(s) of largeness of the core of a subclass of games known as k-convex games (containing the convex...

In context of the traditional Spence signaling model, the realization of a separating equilibrium ensures that each worker is allocated to the sector of the economy where they are most productive. Traditional analysis assumes, however, that the incremental returns to labor employment are...

This paper reviews the game-theoretic literature on collaborative environmental management. It begins with a survey of static models of international environmental agreements (IEAs), comparing their underlying assumptions and their results. Extensions of the basic model to allow for both...

A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of the resource to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? We survey the recent game theoretic approaches that have been followed in solving such "claims problems".

The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several...

We address quality control of products undergoing multiple transshipment stages handled by different parties. Depending on the transportation modes, the stages may expose the products to hostile environments, such as extreme temperatures, which could influence quality. We incorporate the effect...

In the paper two-person nonzero-sum semi-infinite games with bounded payoffs are studied — both with countable and uncountable infinite strategy space. Under some concavity/convexity assumptions they are shown to possess ε-equilibria (equilibria) in strategies with supports consisting of at...

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative...

Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modeling and compution, we suppose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via iterated bilateral...

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an...