This paper establishes three new results for multiproduct oligopolies: 1) it presents the first explicit expression of Nash equilibria for asymmetric multiproduct oligopolies; 2) it shows that reducing a multiproduct firms cost in Bertrand oligopolies will reduce its profits if the cost-reducing...

This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

The advance selling strategy is implemented when a firm offers consumers the opportunity to order its product in advance of the regular selling season. Advance selling reduces uncertainty for both the firm and the buyer and enables the firm to update its forecast of future demand. The...

The advance selling strategy is implemented when a firm offers consumers the opportunity to order its product in advance of the regular selling season. Advance selling reduces uncertainty for both the firm and the buyer and enables the firm to update its forecast of future demand. The...

The authors reply to Colander's comment in this issue on their earlier article (Wang and Yang 2001). They emphasize the necessity to define fixed cost differently than sunk cost because fixed vs. variable costs and sunk vs. avoidable costs classify the total costs from two different...

We study customization in the Hotelling model with two firms. In addition to providing ideal varieties, the perceived uniqueness of a customized product contributes independently to consumer utility. We show that only when consumer preferences for uniqueness are high customization occurs in...

This note studies the transfer of a cost-reducing innovation from an independent patent-holder to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly that has different unit costs of production. It is found that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the independent patent-holder.

By enlarging the parameter space originally considered by Singh and Vives (1984) to allow for a wider range of cost asymmetry, Zanchettin (2006) finds that the Singh and Vives result that firms always make larger profits under quantity competition than under price competition fails to hold. This...