We consider the single-item discrete lot-sizing and scheduling problem. We present a partial linear description of the convex hull of feasible solutions that solves this problem in the presence of Wagner-Whitin costs.

Consider a situation in which a company sells several different items to a set of customers. However, the company is not satisfied with the current pricing strategy and wishes to implement new prices for the items. Implementing these new prices in one single step mightnot be desirable, for...

We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, and give a number of examples of Vickrey algorithms. We consider three performance criteria, one corresponding to a...

In this paper we analyze equilibria in competitive environments under constraints across players'' strategies. This means that the action taken by one player limits the possible choices of the other players. In this context the classical approach, Kakutani''s Fixed Point theorem, does not work....

In this paper a typical situation arising in the assembly of printed circuit boards is investigated. The planning problem we face is how to assemble boards of different types using a single line of placement machines. From a practical viewpoint, the multiplicity of board types adds significantly...

We present constant approximative policies for preemptive stochastic scheduling. We derive policies with a guaranteed performance ratio of 2 for scheduling jobs with release dates on identical parallel machines subject to minimizing the sum of weighted completion times. Our policies as well as...

It is well known that competitive analysis yields results that do not reflect the observed performance of online paging algorithms. Many deterministic paging algorithms achieve the same competitive ratio, ranging from inefficient strategies as flush-when-full to the well-performing...

In the last 20 years competitive analysis has become the main tool for analyzing the quality of online algorithms. Despite of this, competitive analysis has also been criticized: it sometimes cannot discriminate between algorithms that exhibit significantly different empirical behavior or it...

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU...

In this paper we analyse limit pricing by an incumbent when faced by a multi-market entrant which can produce (subject to a constraint) in several markets simultaneously. We find that using three sizes of fixed costs, signalling occurs in even when entry cannot be deterred and that the limit...