In a world characterised by noisy information and conflicting signals, no Central Bank is always able to affect private sector expectations. Based on Morris and Shin's model, monetary policy then becomes an information game, in which individuals form their expectations based on all the...

In a world characterized by noisy information and conflicting signals, no central bank is able to affect private-sector expectations at all times. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of any central bank communication strategy, it is important to know what private agents rely on when they form...

This empirical study revisits the determinants of firms' capital structures. The main focus thereby is onthe 'market timing theory', according to which the current level of the capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to `time the market', i.e. issuing shares when equity is...

Using daily data on inflation-indexed bonds, we find evidence of a negative relationship between ECB communication regarding risks to price stability - measured on the basis of the frequency and strength of the keyword vigilance' - and changes in euro area break-even inflation. However, this...

The benefits of inflation targeting by comparison to alternative regimesare understood to be in terms of providing clearer objectives that help pin down private sector expectations in the long run. We argue that the mechanism for achieving this rests on the fact that monetary policy can be...

More than a monetary policy strategy, we interpret inflation targeting as a framework for communication. We model monetary policy as an information game between the Bank and private agents. Our analysis shows how the provision of an explicit numerical inflation objective overcomes potential...

This paper provides an extension of Morris and Shin's (2002) model (Morris, S., Shin, H. S. (2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521-1534.). It considers an "interpretation bias" of the public signal sent by central banks such as the ECB or the FED....

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and allows for intermediate cases with some restrictions on...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...