We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that...

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that...

We find that the directorial labor market's ability to align the incentives of managers and shareholders depends on the aggregate level of investor protection in a country. If a country's corporate governance environment is strong and boards are likely to protect the interest of shareholders, a...

We find that the strength of countries' legal institutions can explain the ability of private firms to identify and terminate poorly performing managers. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that governance problems in private firms are ameliorated by strong institutions that reduce...

We study the economic consequences of a recent securities regulation that grants U.S. regulators broad new powers to revise or reject foreign acquisitions of firms deemed critical to U.S. national security. Our results document an important tradeoff between U.S. national security and shareholder...

This paper examines the impact of currency derivatives on firm value using a broad sample of firms from thirty-nine countries with significant exchange-rate exposure. Derivatives can be used for managers' self-interest, for hedging or for speculative purposes. We hypothesize that investors can...

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes...