We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has … possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching …) showed that there can be unstable equilibrium outcomes. We prove that any stable matching can be obtained in some equilibrium …

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game … induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. …

-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the particular equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not …This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has … possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

in any which way to obtain results on the welfare properties of trade. Secondly, some matching allocation mechanisms have …This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by … preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so …

in any which way to obtain results on the welfare properties of trade. Secondly, some matching allocation mechanisms have …This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by … preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so …