We present a benchmark model for the optimal speed of transition from a state-owned to a private market economy, based on the consumption-savings decision in a closed economy. We abstract from frictions to focus on the macroeconomic conditions for accumulation of private capital and closure or...

This paper adresses the issue of the optimal speed of economy-wide restructuring from a state-owned to a privately-owned economy. The analysis is led from a general equilibrium perspective, focusing on the role of endogenously generated capital accumulation. Sensitivity of the optimal speed of...

Voting Theory generally concludes that -in first-past-the-post elections- 1) All voters should go to effective candidates (Duverger's Law); 2) Parties' platform should converge (Median Voter Theorem). Observations, though, suggest that such predictions are not met in practice. We show that...

The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an assumption in those...

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two...

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during...

This paper compares the properties of three electoral systems when voters have imperfect information. Imperfect information blurs voter decisions and may divorce the electoral outcome from the true preferences of the electorate. The challenge for electoral design is therefore to translate the...

This Paper examines the optimal structure of management when a decision-maker must have a mass of information processed before making a decision. They can either delegate processing tasks inside their own organization, in which case they retain full authority over the agents, or they hand over...

Why do people vote? This question received a lot of attention for more than thirty years, and yet remains unanswered. In this Paper, we take stock of existing empirical regularities and argue that we can use them to improve the model of instrumental voting. Once this is done, we show that purely...