We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even … relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction … winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are …

A human subject laboratory experiment compares the real-time market performance of the two most popular auction formats … configurations and is statistically significant in most treatments. Revenue capture tends to be similar across auction formats in …

describes the data. Second, we test the auction design of the electricity markets experimentally. The current auction design is … a static bidding framework. We find that if the auction were to operate under a sequential bidding auction, all market …

procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness- to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory … experiment, we compare four different second-price auction formats for procuring a good. The four formats are a sealed …-bid auction and three different descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …

car license auction, many car licenses are sold but each participant can only bid for one license. We examine the … theoretical properties of three auction formats: Shanghai auction, Guangzhou auction, and Singapore auction. Our main results are … that (1) No equilibrium of the Shanghai auction can guarantee an efficient allocation, (2) the Singapore auction allocates …