[eng] Econometricians working on stochastic production and cost frontiers have been interested in estimating the inefficiency of firms. At the same time, economists have considered problems of asymmetric information arising in the contractual relationships between principals and agents. This...

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes...

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory...

Bringing together insights and perspectives from close to 70 of the world’s leading experts in the field, this timely Handbook provides an up-to-date guide to the most recent and state-of-the-art advances in transport economics. The comprehensive coverage includes topics such as the...

Despite its great prevalence in practice, competition through whole schedules of prices as function of quantities remains largely unexplored. To deal with this question, the multiprincipal incentive theory is exploited to build a theoretical model of oligopolistic competition which is fitted to...

We construct and estimate a structural principal/agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban transport sector in a context where operators are privately informed on their innate costs (adverse selection) and can exert cost-reducing managerial effort (moral hazard). This model...