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A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494516
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010123462
A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105832
A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009546873
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756629
Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764541
In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of a game among players. In this paper, we address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication graphs, where the set of feasible coalitions forms a poset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823508
Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106649
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106650
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878382