This paper presents a dual representation of firm-level and market-level equilibrium behavior for a sole proprietorship economy with competitive and frictionless financial markets and stochastic production opportunities in a two-period setting. The dual equilibrium model is used to state...

Quiggin and Chambers have introduced the notion of invariant preferences, and shown that the only invariant expected-utility functionals are those associated with a quadratic utility function. This note identifies the class of preferences which simultaneously satisfy invariance, two-fund...

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the...

This paper has two goals. First,we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility (linear-in-probabilities) preferences and...

We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for differential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannot believe there exist propositions of which he is unaware. Nevertheless, we argue that a boundedly...

We give a formal treatment of optimal risk sharing contracts in the face of ambiguity. The central idea is that boundedly rational individuals do not have access to a language sufficiently rich to describe all possible states of nature. The ambiguity in a contract arises from contractual clauses...

Game-theoretic analysis is a well-established part of the toolkit of economic analysis. In crucial respects, however, game theory has failed to deliver on its original promise of generating sharp predictions of behavior in situations where neoclassical microeconomics has little to say....

In this paper, we generalize the model of Quiggin and Chambers (2004) to allow for ambiguity, and derive conditions, referred to as generalized invariance, under which a two argument representation of preferences may be obtained independent of the existence of a unique probability measure. The...

Separation results, as they are usually understood, refer to conditions under which a firm's production decisions are independent of its risk attitudes. Well-understood situations where separation occurs typically include those where technically feasible production opportunities are replicable...

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and...