We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the...

We revisit a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that under global interactions any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions and in the torus...

We explore the stability of imitation in a 1200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, our...

We study long-run learning in an experimental Cournot game with no explicit information about the payo function. Subjects see only the quantities and payos of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental ndings, duopolies and triopolies both...

We propose a model of price competition where consumers exogenously differ in the number of prices they compare. Our model can be interpreted either as a non-sequential search model or as a network model of price competition. We show that (i) if consumers who previously just sampled one firm...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We fi nd that a payo ff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff domination convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...