We study duopolistic competition in a differentiated market with firms setting prices and quantities, without explicitly imposing market clearing. Unlike the commonly adopted assumption of profit maximizing firms, we assume firm behavior to be shaped by a Darwinian dynamic: the less fitter firm...

We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that attach a rationalnumber to every event. We call these probability measures rational. We introduce the notion of arational belief hierarchy, where the first order beliefs are described by a rational measure overthe...

This paper studies a traditional monopolistic market of information goods in the presenceof an inherently strong peer-to-peer file-sharing network. Specifically, such a strongnetwork is made possible by a few fanatic users who selflessly contribute to the sharingof files. We find that the most...

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus ona new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibilitytheorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions, this...

In this paper we study the effect of information on the occurrence of intentional price wars on the equilibrium path. An episode of low prices is an intentional price war if it follows a period of high prices which was ended intentionally by one of the firms in the market (the price war leader)....

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

We study the impact of strategic commitment on cooperation in indefinitely repeated games ofstrategic substitutes (Cournot) and complements (Bertrand) using laboratory experiments. Overall,strategic commitment has no effect on cooperation with strategic substitutes and a negative onewith...

Individual disagreements are assumed to be reflected in the preferences. Distance functions, e.g.,the well-known Kemeny (1959) distance, are used to measure these disagreements. However, adisagreement on how to rank the top two alternatives may be perceived more (or less) than adisagreement on...

Although both economists and psychologists seek to identify determinants of heterogeneity inbehavior, they use different concepts to capture them. In this review we first analyze theextent to which economic preferences and psychological concepts of personality - such as the BigFive and locus of...