Spiteful, antisocial behavior undermines the moral and institutional fabric of society, producingdisorder, fear and mistrust. Previous research demonstrates the willingness of individuals to harmothers, but little is understood about how far people are willing to go in being spiteful or...

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the WeakSequential Core as the solution concept for such games. We test the stability of a number of wellknown division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, exceptfor the...

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders; they may even induce serious bankruptcy problems.

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any...

The theory of industrial collusion generally does not distinguish between tacit and explicit collusion. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms may still be willing and able to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust...

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, y-strategy-proofness - meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number y cannot manipulate - and unanimity, we show that such rules are...

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept arediscussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closerto an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requiresfurther...

We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than thestandard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Indeed, we simultaneously replace commonknowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with strictly weaker epistemicconditions of pairwise...

Empirical literature and related legal practice using concentration as a proxy for competition measurement are prone to a fallacy of division, as concentration measures are appropriate for perfect competition and perfect collusion but not intermediate levels of competition. Extending the classic...

This book provides a rigorous course to the theory of intermediate microeconomics. It includes not only the basic traditional theory, but also a ¡°From the Literature¡± box in each chapter directing students to applications of the theory. The theory is developed axiomatically, with optional...