One of the reasons why regulators are hesitant about permitting price competition in healthcare markets is that it may damage quality when information is poor. Evidence on whether this fear is well-founded is scarce. We provide evidence using a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers and...

A country's pharmaceutical policy is unique, just like its culture. Japan is no exception. Japan has employed a unique dynamic price-control rule that updates regulated retail prices based on the previous period's transaction prices. At the same time, separation of prescribing and dispensing has...

We test recent theory on the benefits of auctions and bargaining as alternative procurement mechanisms using data on the procurement of medical devices by Italian hospitals. Theory suggests that auctions perform well when cost control is the key concern, but are less effective at producing the...

This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous...

This paper examines the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians'...

This paper reports on a study of expense preference behavior in a conditional sample of hospitals (before and after adoption of contract-management arrangements), using an extension of Mester's (1989) test. To identify expense preference parameters, input demand equations are considered in...

In theory, equilibrium profits for drug patent holders would not involve significant restraints on production and patient utilization if the market had a mechanism for two-part pricing (Oi 1971) or quantity commitments (Murphy, Snyder, and Topel 2014). In fact, patent expiration has little...

In theory, equilibrium profits for drug patent holders would not involve significant restraints on production and patient utilization if the market had a mechanism for two-part pricing (Oi 1971) or quantity commitments (Murphy, Snyder, and Topel 2014). In fact, patent expiration has little...

This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous...